Pseudocontingencies - a key paradigm for understanding adaptive cognition by Fiedler, Klaus
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBEREICH 504
Rationalita¨tskonzepte,
Entscheidungsverhalten und
o¨konomische Modellierung
Universita¨t Mannheim
L 13,15
68131 Mannheim
No. 07-54
Pseudocontingencies - A key paradigm for
understanding adaptive cognition
Klaus Fiedler∗
July 2007
Thanks are due to Nick Chater, Peter Freytag, Ralph Hertwig, Florian Kutzner, Mike Oaksford,
and Tobias Vogel for their thoughtful and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this chap-
ter. Correspondence concerning should be addressed to Klaus Fiedler, Psychologisches Institut,
Universita¨t Heidelberg, Hauptstrasse 47-51, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany. Fax: + 49 / 6221 /
547745. Email: kf@psychologie.uni-heidelberg.de
∗Sonderforschungsbereich 504/ Universita¨t Heidelberg, email: Klaus Fiedler@psi-sv2.psi.uni-
heidelberg.de
  
 
 
 
 
Pseudocontingencies – A key paradigm for understanding adaptive cognition 
Klaus Fiedler (University of Heidelberg) 
 
 
To appear in: 
N. Chater & M. Oaksford (Eds.) 
The probabilistic mind: 
Prospects for rational models of cognition 
 
 
 
Running Head: Pseudocontingencies – A key paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Note: Thanks are due to Nick Chater, Peter Freytag, Ralph Hertwig, Florian 
Kutzner, Mike Oaksford, and Tobias Vogel for their thoughtful and constructive comments on 
an earlier draft of this chapter. Correspondence concerning should be addressed to Klaus 
Fiedler, Psychologisches Institut, Universität Heidelberg, Hauptstrasse 47-51, 69117 
Heidelberg, Germany. Fax: + 49 / 6221 / 547745. Email:  kf@psychologie.uni-heidelberg.de 
 2 Pseudocontingencies 
The probabilistic mind has to mirror the structure of the probabilistic world. Because the 
mind reflects the environment, the topic of the present volume should not be misunderstood 
as referring only to intrapsychic processes within individual organisms' brains or minds. 
Rather, the "probabilistic mind" refers to the adaptive match between cognitive functions and 
environmental tasks and affordances. Studying the probabilistic mind calls for a cognitive-
ecological approach that relates mental functions to environmental structures, rather than a 
purely cognitive approach that relates individual mental functions to micro-level intrapsychic 
processes, such as neuronal processes. In this respect, the cognitive-ecological perspective 
that guides the present article, and most other articles in the present book, may be conceived 
as complementary to a neuro-scientific approach to the human mind. The cognitive illusion 
that is in the focus of the present chapter – called pseudocontingencies – highlights the need 
to study the top-down constraints imposed by the environment on cognitive behavior, which 
are quite distinct from the bottom-up constraints of internal neuronal processes.  
The Nature of the Probabilistic World 
Before I can explain and illustrate the key concept of pseudocontingencies, a moment of 
reflection is in order about the nature of the probabilistic world. What renders nature so 
uncertain and so difficult to handle? A most common answer suggests, like the title of this 
book, that difficulty arises because the world is probabilistic, rather than deterministic. Real 
correlations are hardly ever perfect. Although there is no question that imperfect, probabilistic 
correlations are more difficult to represent in memory than deterministic relations, I believe 
that this idea provides only an impoverished picture of the actual vicissitudes of the complex 
world. Imperfect, merely probabilistic relations between environmental variables need not in 
and of themselves be taxing and complicating. They can be quite plausible, natural, and they 
can create optimism. That the relationship between socio-economic status and income is less 
than perfect creates hope and chances in those belonging to the lower social class. Any 
optimism presupposes that the future world is not totally determined. Thus, probabilistic 
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relations are desired properties in a world that should be predictable on one hand while 
leaving latitude for change and improvement on the other hand. 
What is really bothersome and a permanent source of conflict and erroneous decisions, 
though, is the fact that the "true" relationship that actually holds between any two variables is 
often ambiguous, or indeterminate, because there is more than one correct or best solution. To 
illustrate this ultimate source of uncertainty, which pervades virtually all normative models of 
rational behavior, let us look for the common denominator underlying the following 
paradigms of psychological research: 
(a) A delay of gratification task (Metcalf & Mischel, 1999) involves a forced choice 
between one option leading to a relative short-term advantage (e.g., shorter education  
earlier job with a reasonable income) and another option leading to a relative long-term 
advantage (longer education  qualification for greater variety of jobs). Determining the 
"best" option involves a trade-off between short-term and long-term utilities, and a decision 
for the most appropriate time frame to assess the utility. There is no a priori principle saying 
that a long-term frame is more "real" or "more rational" than a short-term frame.   
(b) A dilemma task is by definition a task that involves a conflict between two 
strategies, to defect or to cooperate. The pay-off of defecting is higher at the level of 
individual trials. However, averaging across many trials of a dilemma game, cooperation is 
the more successful strategy, because extended defection evokes negative payoffs or sanctions 
from the environment that override the seeming advantage. What strategy is optimal cannot 
be determined absolutely. It depends on the level of analysis, as evident in economists’ 
differential treatment of single-shot games and games repeated over multiple trials.  
(c) Many optimizing problems call for a choice between two options. An animal whose 
major adaptive task is to find and collect food may experience that the average amount of 
food is higher in location A than in location B. At the level of the individual animal, then, it is 
rational to move to A. However, when aggregating over many individuals of the same 
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species, this implies that other animals will move to A as well, causing a hard and dangerous 
competition for resources and a virtual decrease in the actual amount of food provided well 
below the average amount that could be expected from the less prominent location B.  
(d) Conversely, Simpson's (1951) paradox typically starts with an overall correlation 
showing that, say, more female than male applicants for graduate studies are rejected. 
However, as this aggregate relationship is broken down to a lower level of analysis, the 
apparent correlation turns out to be spurious. Within both of two graduate programs, females 
are more successful than males. The apparent disadvantage of females in the overall analysis 
merely reflects the fact that most females apply to the more difficult graduate program with a 
greatly enhanced rejection rate. In other words, when the impact of the unequal graduate 
programs is partialled out (i.e., when changing from an overall to a more specific level of 
analysis), the sign of the observed correlation is reversed. Again, there is no a priori basis for 
considering the partial correlation more correct than the zero-order correlation. To be sure, it 
is possible that a true female advantage is only visible when the impact of specific programs 
is controlled for. However, it is also possible that the higher rejection rate of the seemingly 
more difficult program merely reflects a higher rate of female applicants.  
(e) When it comes to correlations over time, spectral analysis or time series analysis 
tells us that the correlation that holds between two variables over time depends on the 
frequency or periodic unit. Sometimes, correlations emerge strongly when considering time 
segments of seconds or milliseconds (e.g., EEG data) but disappear when aggregating 
measures over larger time units. Other trends of correlations can only be assessed at the level 
of long-term moving averages (e.g., the global warming effect and its correlates). In still other 
domains (e.g., the stock market), correlations (e.g., between share values and unemployment 
rates) may be positive in the short run and negative in the long run. In general, time-series 
analyses highlight the fact that different frequency filters render different phenomena visible.  
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(f) Last but not least, to add a prominent example from social psychology, the hidden-
profile paradigm in group decision making (Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2006; Stasser & Titus, 
1985) involves divergent decision preferences at the levels of the entire group and its 
individual members. One option excels in the information available to individual decision 
makers; applying an "optimal" majority or Condorcet rule (Hastie & Kameda, 2005) will lead 
the group to choose this very option. However, when all information distributed over all 
group members is shared by communication, another option may be superior. Although the 
common premise in this paradigm is that the group-level information is the validity criterion, 
there is no rational basis for this assumption. It is very possible that the quality of the totally 
shared information is worse than the individual-level information. In any case, correlations 
and preference structures can change and even reverse when information is aggregated over 
individuals or group members – a huge challenge for all democratic societies. Thomas 
Schelling’s (1978) book on micromotives and macrobehavior anticipated these intriguing 
insights three decades ago.  
Ecological Correlations Provide a Statistical Model 
All these paradigms share, as a common denominator, the disillusioning insight that 
globally correct solutions for these puzzles and pitfalls of the probabilistic world may not 
exist. What is correct, rational, or beneficial can only be determined locally, that is, 
conditional on pragmatic assumptions that specify a specific perspective, aggregation level, or 
units of analysis. Standard normative models, such as correlation statistics or Bayesian 
calculus, only afford a locally rational solution, once a specific perspective and level of 
analysis has been chosen. They offer no way of dealing with the trade-off between the 
solutions pertinent to different aggregation levels.  
For a statistical model of the generic structure underlying these multi-level problems, let 
us refer back to the old notion of ecological correlations, which provides a starting point for 
our recent research on pseudocontingencies, the focus of the present chapter. As indicated by 
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Robinson (1950) and explained statistically by Hammond (1973), the correlation between 
race and illiteracy can be close to zero when computed across individuals. However, when 
computed at the level of districts or larger ecologies, the correlation between the average rate 
of Black people and the average illiteracy rate can rise to over +.90. In a similar vein, the 
correlation between price and quality can vary greatly when computed over either individual 
consumer products or markets or providers. Or, the relation between socio-economic status 
and academic performance can be quite different when considering either individual students, 
or entire classes, or school systems.  
One must not discard these examples as simply reflecting reliability artefacts (i.e., the 
enhanced reliability of aggregate units of measurement). Indeed, it is easy to find correlations 
that are stronger at individual than at aggregate levels. The actual reason for divergent 
correlations is that different causal factors can be operating at different levels. Consider the 
following example, which provides a generative model to understand and simulate the degree 
of divergence between aggregation levels that is possible. Imagine there are 50 towns in a 
country, differing in the tourist ratio (relative to the total population of a town) and the 
average consumption rate (i.e., the amount of money spent by an average person on a day). 
Across all towns, the correlation between tourism and consumption is probably very high, 
because nice towns attract both tourists and rich people whereas nasty towns will remain for 
poor people and have few tourists. In contrast, assuming that all residents of the country have 
a clearly higher income than tourists from other countries (if the focal country is, say, 
Switzerland), the individual correlation between tourism and consumption (within towns) 
may be negative. That is, the higher the rate of tourists (with markedly lower income) in any 
town, the lower the consumption. Thus, a causal parameter of towns (i.e., attractiveness) can 
account for a high positive correlation, while a causal parameter for individuals (i.e., income) 
can account for the co-existing negative correlation. No artefact is involved. The two 
correlations are equally correct. They just reflect a genuine divergence between aggregation 
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levels. Using this problem for recent simulations and decision experiments, it was easily 
possible to create co-existing correlations as positive as +.76 at town level and, yet, as 
negative as –.48 at individual level.1  
Problems like these are neither artefactual nor far-fetched. In many real-world domains, 
they appear to be the rule rather than the exception. In psychological research, for instance – 
to put the finger on a nearby-ecology – researchers use to employ group data to make 
inferences about genuinely individual processes (such as memory or emotions). There is no 
guarantee, however, even in experimental research, that group aggregates reflect the same 
relationships that exist within individuals and that are often the focus of theoretical interest.2 
Researchers who commit the category mistake to base inferences about individual processes 
on group averages come very close to the pseudocontingency illusion to be introduced next. 
The Pseudocontingency Illusion – A Cognitive Analog of Ecological Bias 
For a more vivid illustration of this cognitive illusion, which can be understood as a 
cognitive analog of Robinson's (1950) ecological bias, consider a teacher who is confronted 
with the task of evaluating and grading the performance of boys and girls in a physics class 
(cf. Figure 1). Imagine a teacher who, at the beginning of a new school year, enters a class 
that has a high baserate of boys (75%) and a high baserate of high achievement (75% correct 
responses). In another class, then, the teacher encounters a low baserate of boys (25%) jointly 
with a low baserate of good achievement (25%). Empathizing with the teacher, we understand 
that at this point she will already assume a positive correlation between male gender and 
achievement in physics. This conviction will increase to certainty when there are two other 
classes, again one with high baserates and one with low baserates of both attributes. However, 
                                                 
1
 To simulate n individuals' consumption, one only has to use a (e.g., normally distributed) random variable of 
inter-individual consumption differences and add a salary parameter s for residents (rather than tourists) and to 
add an attractiveness parameter a for all people (residents as well as tourists) in attractive towns. Depending on 
the value of a and s, relative to the variance between individuals, the resulting correlations can differ markedly. 
2
 Although experimental designs based on randomized groups attempt to eliminate the systematic variance 
between groups, the problem may still persist in more subtle ways, for instance, when experimental treatments 
(e.g., emotion treatments) applied to groups do not guarantee the same influence on every individual. 
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a glance at individual students' performance shows that within all four classes, the good-
achievement rate is lower for boys than for girls (see Figure 1). Pooling across all four 
classes, the correlation turns out to be zero. A teacher who – like the empathic reader of this 
paragraph – believes to have experienced an advantage of boys although boys are in fact not 
superior, or even inferior, to girls, has fallen prey to the pseudocontingency (PC) illusion.3 
Definition of the PC illusion. How can the PC illusion be defined and explicated more 
precisely? – To introduce the concept, consider the elementary case of a relation between two 
variables, X and Y, in a two-dimensional space. (A more general definition extends to an n-
dimensional relation in n-dimensional space.) To keep within the preceding example, let X 
and Y be two dichotomous variables, student gender and achievement. The genuine 
contingency between these two variables is determined by the 2 x 2 joint frequencies of a 
contingency table (cf. Figure 2). Virtually all previous research assumes that the cognitive 
process of contingency assessment is a function of the four stimulus frequencies, a, b, c, d, in 
accordance with standard statistical correlation models (Allan, 1990; Alloy & Tabachnik, 
1984; Fiedler, 2000a; McKenzie, 1994). Errors and biases in correlation assessment are 
attributed to unequal attention and differential weights given to these four cells, due to prior 
expectancies, the salience of variable levels, or the asymmetry of present versus absent 
information. In any case, it is presupposed that human (like animal) contingency assessment 
is based on a cognitive function that uses the joint frequencies, or cell entries, as its argument.  
In contrast, a pseudocontingency (PC) is an inference rule that uses the marginals of the 
contingency table, rather than the cell entries (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004; Fiedler, Freytag & 
Unkelbach, 2007; Freytag, 2003). In other words, the PC algorithm (mis)takes two skewed 
baserate distributions for a contingency. When the marginals or baserate distributions are 
skewed in the same direction (i.e., mostly male students and mostly good achievement), the 
                                                 
3
 Note that the term “illusion” does not imply the violation of an incontestable norm of rationality. PC illusions 
can be functional or dysfunctional, depending on what level of aggregation is adequate, just as the functionality 
of other illusions, like overconfidence, depends on the learning environment (cf. Haselton & Funder, in press; 
Hoffrage, Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 2000). 
 9 Pseudocontingencies 
inferred contingency between male gender and achievement is positive. When the marginals 
or baserate distributions are skewed in opposite directions (i.e., mostly male students but 
rarely good achievement), the inferred contingency is negative. As vividly shown in Figure 2, 
inferring a contingency from the alignment of two baserate distributions is not justified, 
because the same baserates allow for positive, zero, and positive correlations. Confusing 
baserates with contingencies is like confusing two main effects (i.e., a row difference and a 
column difference) with an interaction (changing column differences as a function of rows). 
However, judges and decision makers – or more generally: organisms – commit this category 
mistake in many different task contexts, as evident from a good deal of empirical evidence 
reviewed in the next section.  
In fact, the PC illusion is not as stupid as it may appear at first sight. Like Robinson’s 
(1950) ecological bias and the other multi-level problems depicted at the outset, the PC 
illusion produces an error at one level but a sound inference at another, aggregate level. After 
all, at the level of classes, the rates of boys and of good achievement are jointly elevated, in 
comparison to some normative standard that usually holds for other classes. Indeed, by 
exposing the teacher to a contrast class with a low baserate of boys and a low baserate of good 
achievement (regardless of the within-class correlation across students), the teacher’s PC 
illusion could be amplified. However, such an explicit ecological correlation between the 
proportions of boys and higher achievers across two or more classes or ecologies is not 
strictly necessary for the PC effect to occur. Even if there is but one class or ecology, the 
teacher can use her prior knowledge of normal classes to infer the covariation of baserates 
across ecologies, whether explicitly observed or implicitly memorized.  
Thus, to complete the definition, PCs result when the correlation of category baserates is 
(mis)taken for inferring the correlation of individual measures. The term PC refers to illusions 
arising from this inference rule; it does not refer to the erronesous outcome of an illusory 
correlation inference, which can reflect many other processes (cf. Fiedler, 2000a). The PC 
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illusion occurs under many conditions that render the efficient assessment and encoding of 
aggregate-level information (i.e., baserates) more likely than individuating information (i.e., 
joint frequencies). By analogy, a generalized definition of PCs in n-dimensional space says 
that inferences on complex contingencies involving n dimensions are often based on 
observations gathered in an aggregate space of lower dimensionality (resulting from 
aggregation over some dimensions). Thus, with reference to the above PC example, cognitive 
inferences about a three-dimensional data array, involving student performance x gender 
groups x students within gender groups, are based on a two-dimensional array involving 
aggregate scores for performance x gender groups.4  
Empirical Evidence. A cursory review of empirical evidence for experimentally 
controlled PC effects will further help to illustrate the various manifestations of the illusion. 
Note that, psychologically, PCs suggest a tendency for higher-order, aggregate correlations to 
dominate and overshadow lower-order, individuating correlations. A recent series of 
experiments conducted within a simulated classroom paradigm (Fiedler et al., 2007) speaks to 
the very example that was used here to introduce the phenomenon, namely the correlation 
between student gender and achievement.  
In this paradigm, participants are asked to take the role of a teacher who has to observe 
the performance of a class of 16 students, 8 boys and 8 girls, represented graphically on the 
computer screen. Each lesson is devoted to a particular subject matter, such as maths, physics, 
English or German. Over an extended period of time, the teacher can select a knowledge 
question from a pull-down menu of questions representing the subject matter. Once a question 
is announced, a subset of all students raises their hand, and the teacher selects one student 
who then provides either a correct or a wrong answer. Across many question-answer cycles of 
this kind, the teacher can assess the achievement of all 16 students in the class. As each 
                                                 
4
 More generally, PC-like inferences occur whenever a higher-dimensional problem design (e.g., a 4-dimensional 
design involving factors A x B x C x D) is “studied”, either in people’s mind or in science, through one or more 
sub-designs (e.g., design A x B; design C x D; design A x D etc.), which aggregate over the levels of the omitted 
factors. 
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student’s true ability parameter (i.e., his or her probability of providing a correct response) 
and motivation parameter (i.e., his or her probability of raising hand) are controlled by the 
computer program that drives the simulated classroom, both the accuracy and the potential 
biases in the teachers’ assessment can be studied systematically.  
In one experiment, teachers were asked to test the hypothesis that boys are good in 
science (maths and physics) whereas girls are good in language, corresponding to common 
gender stereotypes. This led most participants to engage in positive testing (Klayman & Ha, 
1987; Oaksford & Chater, 1994), that is, to ask more questions to boys in science and to girls 
in language lessons. Consequently, the gender baserate distributions were skewed in opposite 
directions for science and language lessons; there were clearly more answers from boys in 
science but clearly more answers from girls in language. Distinct PC effects were induced 
when these skewed gender baserates were aligned with the skewed correctness baserates of 
smart students (with a correctness rate of 80%). For smart students in science, the coincidence 
of mostly male responses and mostly correct responses led teachers to judge the ability of 
smart boys higher than the ability of smart girls (with the same objective ability parameter). 
For language lessons in contrast, mostly female responses and mostly correct responses led 
teachers to judge smart girls higher than (objectively equivalent) smart boys. Closer analyses 
revealed that this finding was confined to those teachers who actually engaged in positive 
testing (i.e., who actually produced skewed gender distributions). 
That the PC bias reflects the alignment of skewed baserates, rather than expectancies 
based on gender stereotypes, was demonstrated by the reverse task instruction, namely, to test 
the hypothesis that (in this particular class) girls tend to be good in science but boys tend to be 
good in language. Positive testing now led teachers to mainly focus on girls in science and on 
boys in language, thus producing an opposite skew in the gender baserates. As a consequence, 
mostly female and mostly correct responses led teachers to judge smart girls higher than smart 
boys in science. In language, in contrast, mostly male responses together with mostly correct 
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responses led smart boys appear superior to smart girls. Again, the biases were confined to 
those teachers who actually engaged in positive testing, the precondition of skewed gender 
baserates.  
In another experiment from the same series, a PC effect accounts for the impact of the 
class context on the evaluation of individual students’ performance. In one class, the ability of 
all students was set to a constant correctness baserate of 70%. In another class, the correctness 
baserate was constantly low, 30%. Within both ecologies, the individual students’ motivation 
parameters varied from 20% to 50% and 80%. Thus, the true correlation between students’ 
motivation and their ability was by definition zero, because individual ability was invariant 
and the correctness of responses to specific questions depended on the computer’s random 
generator, which is independent of whether a student had raised his or her hand or not.  
Nevertheless, distinct PC effects reflected subjectively inferred correlations between 
motivation and ability. In a high-ability class environment, with a high correctness baserate, 
the motivation baserates for highly motivated students was skewed in the same direction, 
suggesting a positive PC, which led teachers to judge the ability of high-motivation students 
higher than low-motivation students. In contrast, in a low-ability environment, the low 
correctness baserates were skewed in a direction opposite to the high hand-raising baserates 
of highly motivated students. The resulting negative PC suggested a negative relation between 
motivation and ability, leading teachers to judge the ability of high-motivation students lower 
than the ability of low-motivation students (whose low motivation baserates were well aligned 
with the low correctness baserates).  
In still other experiments, PC effects demonstrated the impact of group aggregates on 
judgments of individual students. The class was divided into two subgroups of eight students 
supposed to come from different former classes or teachers. In one subgroup, there were 
mostly high-ability students and high-motivation students, whereas the other subgroup 
consisted of mostly low-ability and low-motivation students. However, crucially, the 
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correlation between ability and motivation at the level of students was zero, as the ratio of 
high to low ability students was the same among both high and low motivation students. 
Nevertheless, when teachers rated the individual students’ ability and motivation at the end of 
the session, the resulting sets of 16 ratings were correlated, reflecting a typical PC effect. The 
coincidence of high baserates of both attributes in one subgroup and low baserates of both 
attributes in the other subgroup – that is, the existing correlation between ability and 
motivation baserates at the level of subgroups – misled teachers to infer a corresponding 
correlation at the level of individual students.  
An analogous finding was obtained in still another experiment between individual 
students’ positions on two political attitude topics, as uttered in a civics lesson. Although the 
correlation between the 16 students’ pro and con positions on one attitude were completely 
uncorrelated with their pro and con stands on the other attitude, the teachers believed to have 
seen a correlation because one subgroup of students held mostly pro attitudes on both topics, 
whereas another subgroup held mostly con attitudes on both topics. The sign of the PC 
illusion was reversed, that is, teachers believed that pro positions on one attitude came along 
with con positions on the other attitude, when the baserates of pros and cons in the two 
subgroups were skewed in opposite directions. 
Convergent evidence for PC illusions that reflect the same theoretical principle 
(alignment of skewed baserates) comes from a whole variety of task settings and content 
domains. Conceptual replications include PCs between individual scores on different 
personality tests, when respondents belong to different groups with different baserates of test 
scores (Fiedler & Freytag, 2003); PCs between dieting and symptoms of patients in two wards 
of a hospital (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004); PCs between a couple’s responses to the items of a 
partner questionnaire when several subtests yield different baserates of yes and no responses 
(Freytag, Fiedler, Randoll & Vogel, 2007); between the occurrence of a virus and a disease in 
different geographical areas (Fiedler & Graf, 1990); or between the desirability of behavior 
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and the belongingness to one of two social groups with different towns serving as ecologies 
(Meiser, 2006; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004).  
In more recent studies, we were even able to demonstrate PC effects in sequential 
learning and speeded classification tasks such as evaluative priming with different baserates 
of positive and negative primes and targets (Fiedler, Blümke & Unkelbach, 2007), in the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) with different baserates of target attributes and valence 
attributes (Blümke & Fiedler, 2007), and in Goodie and Fantino’s (1996) probability-learning 
paradigm (Kutzner, Freytag, Vogel & Fiedler, 2007). 
Of particular interest is the analysis of the specific task conditions that give rise to PC 
illusions. An overview of the available evidence suggests, first of all, that the phenomenon 
generalizes over a variety of conditions. PC effects have been shown to result from the 
alignment of skewed baserate distributions in a single group, in two groups, or in four groups 
or categories. PCs occur whether the groups or ecologies can be assumed to reflect a common 
cause of the skewed baserates (i.e., preceding therapy in one group as a cause of skewed test 
baserates) or a common effect (i.e., therapy as a consequence of observed test values).  
Setting PCs apart from genuine contingencies. Most importantly, the illusion 
generalizes over different presentation modes, called successive versus simultaneous. In the 
successive presentation mode, participants are first presented information about individuals’ 
high versus low values on one variable (e.g., test X) in one run, before they are later presented 
information about a second variable (test Y) in another run. In other words, they are not fed 
with genuine contingency information about the joint occurrence of X and Y in the same 
persons. Rather, they merely receive information about the uni-variate distribution of each 
variable within the group. It is this condition that clearly sets PCs apart from the usual 
contingency assessment paradigm, in which the stimuli are always bi-variate observations of 
both variables shown at the same time. Thus, in the successive mode, participants have no 
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chance to solicit the contingency proper; the only remarkable finding is that participants 
readily infer subjective contingencies from two separate series of uni-variate observations.  
In the simultaneous presentation mode, in contrast, joint observations for both variables 
(e.g., test X and Y) are presented simultaneously, linked to the same person, thus providing all 
information that is necessary to assess the genuine contingency. PCs are pitted against 
contingencies (cf. Figure 2a); that is, skewed marginal distributions suggest a PC opposite to 
the contingencies given by the cell entries of the contingency table. It is remarkable that even 
in this “home domain” of contingency assessment, PCs often override contingencies proper. 
In other words, even though the joint frequencies or cell entries are available, participants 
utilize the baserates or marginals for contingency inferences. This intrusion of PC illusions 
into the contingency domain suggests the challenging idea that many previous findings on 
illusory correlations may, to an unknown degree, reflect hidden PC effects. 
Learning Environments Fostering the Evolution of PC Illusions 
Why should evolution have allowed homo sapiens to develop such a serious category 
mistake, given the great adaptive value of accurate contingency assessment? Why should an 
organism exposed to the contingency in Figure 2a, which is negative (r = –.20), make 
predictions from individual X to Y scores as if the relation were positive, as suggested from 
the alignment of skewed distributions (mostly high values on both X and Y)?  
Upon some reflection, there are indeed several good reasons for PCs. An analysis of the 
learning environments in which organisms typically have to assess contingencies shows that 
PC-based inferences are not at all stupid or irrational. First of all, it has to be kept in mind that 
PCs are not simply wrong or fully detached from reality; rather, they correctly reflect 
ecological correlations that hold at an aggregate level of groups or higher-order categories. 
The question then becomes why and under what conditions is homo sapiens inclined to assess 
ecological correlations at aggregate level rather than individuating correlations at more 
specific levels, even when a decision problem calls for individuating information?   
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Nasty environment for contingency assessment. A simple and striking answer to this 
crucial question can be found if one considers the structure of the probabilistic world 
surrounding the probabilistic mind. To illustrate this point, let us return to the teacher who is 
to learn correlates of student achievement. There are many potential correlates in the 
information environment: student motivation, personality of teacher, instruction style, socio-
economic status, TV consumption, variation between subject matters, and so forth (cf. Figure 
3). As the teacher gathers data about student achievement, she does not know which particular 
correlate will be the focus of a judgment problem at some future time. To be prepared for any 
problem (i.e., relating achievement to any of these correlates), the teacher would have to 
assess the full multivariate contingency table. Here, however, she encounters a number of 
insurmountable problems. First, the environment rarely provides us with complete 
multivariate data points. At the very time when a student’s achievement is observed, the 
corresponding data for many other variables (SES, former teacher’s method, parents’ style) 
may not be available. Second, even if it were available, the teacher’s attention focus (on 
achievement) would typically prevent her from effectively assessing all the other variables at 
the same time. Third, even when multivariate information is available and the teacher is able 
to jointly attend to and encode the multivariate contingency data, memory restrictions would 
prevent her from remembering the full multi-dimensional distribution. Fourth, the time and 
patience needed to fill such a monstrous array with data would paralize the teacher. Before the 
rarest cells of the giant design are filled with observations, the school year would be over.  
Thus, closer analysis of the information input from which correlations have to be 
inferred reveals that the notion of multivariate observations, which is so familiar from 
statistics courses, may be far away from the real empirical world. Exactly because extensional 
information about joint frequencies is often not available, several authors have emphasized 
that causal inferences and contingency judgments have to rely on intensional information and 
spatial-temporal contiguity (Chater & Oaksford, 2006; Fiedler, 2000a).  
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PC inferences afford a viable alternative. However, the PC illusion suggests an 
alternative. Even when joint frequencies of the full Cartesian product of all event 
combinations cannot be used, statistical information may still be used at a realistic level. Just 
like animals can naturally learn statistical proportions, such as the reinforcement rate 
associated with specific ecologies, or the baserate of a signal or conditional stimulus, the 
teacher can be assumed to be quite effective at learning the baserates of observations for many 
attributes of interest: a student’s baserate of correct responses as an indicator of achievement; 
the student’s rate of raising hands as an indicator of motivation; the relative number of TV-
related remarks from that student etc. To be sure, these learned proportions or baserates 
cannot be interpreted on an absolute scale; they only provide ordinal information about the 
relative prevalence of an attribute across different ecologies. A particular student is 
characterized by a high baserate of correct responses (high achievement) and, observed on a 
different occasion, a high baserate of raising hands (motivation), or by a relatively low 
proportion of TV comments (low TV consumption). There is no evidence that individual 
responses are more correct when the same student raised her hand or on particular days 
following high TV consumption. Rather, at a higher level of aggregation, the teacher 
combines a high achievement baserate with a high motivation baserate, or a low TV baserate, 
in a PC-type inference. Similarly, at the level of classes, when the achievement baserate is 
high and the motivation baserate is also high, the co-occurrence of two baserates is used for 
inferring a positive contingency between motivation and achievement.  
PC inferences in empirical research. From this sketch, it is but a small step to realizing 
that our teacher basically applies the same rationale that empirical scientists use in a 
probabilistic world that calls for analyses of group data to filter out noise and unreliability. 
For example, researchers compare student groups with different baserates of TV consumption 
and conclude from differential aggression baserates in both groups that TV enhances 
aggression. However, the PC inference is not only common in correlational research but even 
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extends to empirical research. In a typical experimental setting, a manipulation (e.g., films to 
induce good mood) is administered to an experimental group but not to a control group. A 
manipulation check is then used to ensure that a majority of participants in the experimental 
group shows the intended change on an independent variable (mood). If a majority of 
participants in the experimental group exhibits an effect in the dependent variable (e.g., 
increased top-down inferences; Fiedler, 2001), researchers assume to have demonstrated an 
individual-level causal influence of mood on cognition: positive mood causes top-down 
thinking. However, the ecological correlation between mood and cognition baserates at group 
level does not logically imply that mood and cognition are related within individuals (e.g., 
watching the film may have caused good mood in most participants, and the same film may 
have also caused a procedural priming of top-down thinking, but independently of the mood 
effect). Whatever the real impact of the group treatment was, it may have affected mood and 
cognition independently, inducing the same tendency toward top-down thinking in both 
subsets of good-mood and bad-mood participants. To repeat, two baserates do not make up a 
contingency proper.  
PC-like thinking is also common when scientists engage in theoretical reasoning. 
Theoretical models often involve more variables than can be controlled in singular 
experiments. Facing this situation, empirical tests of a theory linking a dependent variable Y 
to, say, four independent variables U,V,W,X, are based on different experiments, each of 
which includes a different subset of, say, two independent variables: U,V; U,W; U,X and so 
forth. Researchers then combine the findings obtained in two-factorial designs to inferences 
about a four-factorial theory. Logically, this inference from two-factorial relations to a four-
factorial relation reflects the same category mistake as the elementary PC inference from two 
main effects (baserate tendencies) to an interaction (contingency).  
Thus, when everyday judges and decision makers fall prey to PC effects, they seem to 
adapt to hard constraints of the information ecology, which also force scientists to resort to 
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the same inference scheme. Just because in reality complete multivariate data arrays are either 
not available, or because the assessment and memorization of such highly demanding data is 
not feasible, a plausible and economical heuristic is to resort to sizeable contingencies at 
aggregate level. Rather than assessing the contingency of student achievement and TV 
consumption (in addition to SES, motivation, parent’s profession etc.) over individual 
students, the teacher analyzes the relation between baserates of all these variables in different 
ecologies (e.g., groups, categories, time aggregates). Likewise, researchers take the 
correlation of group baserates as evidence for intra-individual processes. All this may be 
considered a normal manifestation of bounded rationality (Simon, 1956) – a rationality that is 
bounded by the accessibility constraints of the environment and by the cognitive-capacity 
constraints of the human mind.  
Functional value of PCs. As already pointed out, there is often no alternative to using 
aggregate data as a proxy for individuating processes, that is, to making inferences from 
categories to individual cases. However, the crucial question is whether the PC proxy is 
functional, informing correct predictions and decisions. The above allusion to the analogy 
between PCs and scientific inference already suggests that the proxy cannot be that irrational. 
Prudent theorists (e.g., Huttenlocher, Hedges & Vevea, 2000) have made a strong point 
arguing that reliance on category knowledge may often inform rational inferences. However, 
explicating the functionality of PC illusions is not that easy. The utility (i.e., the benefits and 
costs) of judges’ reliance on group baserates or averages depends on several considerations.  
First of all, there is no a priori ground to assume that any particular aggregation level is 
the ultimately true or most useful level. PC illusions shift attention toward contingencies that 
hold at higher rather than at lower levels of aggregation. But what can be said about the 
functionality of such a shift? – One asset, already pointed out, is that higher levels of 
aggregation make assessment possible at all. Another obvious asset of aggregation is to 
increase the reliability of observations in a fallible, noisy world. Sill another, related 
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advantage is that regularities observed at a higher level are more general and less restricted to 
the peculiarities of higher-order interactions and particular cases. However, aside from these 
apparent assets, it is worth while speculating about the systematic influence that a bias toward 
higher aggregate levels can have in the long run.  
Crucial to adaptive cognition is the prediction and control of the origins of positive and 
negative payoffs. A cognitive module that supports the formation of higher aggregates (e.g., 
averages over longer time segments) forces the organism to attend more to long-term, global 
payoffs than to short-term, local payoffs. This can be of considerable value in overcoming 
delay-of-gratification problems, which is a precondition for long-term adaptive behavior.  
In a similar vein, causal influences may be induced more effectively and interventions 
may often be more feasible at the aggregate level of ecologies than at the level of particular 
individuals. Just as experimental treatments do not warrant the same influence on every 
individual but only an average influence on a randomized group, many everyday interventions 
may be more easily applied to ecologies than to individuals. The teacher can make her lesson 
more interesting or change her teaching style for the whole class. Purchasing a TV set 
changes the ecology rather than a specific student. Similarly, for an animal to survive, it is 
typically more feasible to avoid certain ecologies than to try to change an individual predator. 
Or, for a consumer to reduce the consumption costs, she should search for a less expensive 
market rather than trying to negotiate the price of individual products. Anyway, to arrive at an 
informed analysis of the adaptive value of PC illusions, one has to engage in a systematic 
analysis of the payoff structure of the environment – which is a demanding theoretical task.  
As usual, the various benefits of aggregate-level assessment come along with distinct 
costs. To the extent that ecological class differences intrude into the teacher’s evaluation of 
individual students’ performance, of course, evaluation becomes unfair and biased. After all, 
what has to be evaluated is individual students’ performance, independent of the class. In this 
regard, it cannot be denied that PCs, like all cognitive illusions, turn out to produce erroneous 
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results when carried over to new task settings, for which they are not functional. Nevertheless, 
from a more distant perspective, interpreting individual students’ achievement in the context 
of their class environment is not that irrational, for the causes of achievement may be found at 
class level (teacher, group behavior, subject matter) and appropriate interventions may also lie 
at class level. What is good and effective from a systemic or evolutionary point of view may 
not always appear “fair” or “just” at individual level.  
Failures to Aggregate: Factors that Counteract PC Illusions 
If an analysis of the learning context of contingency assessment renders the PC illusion 
plausible, then by the same token the learning environment may also explain those conditions 
that counteract PC illusions. Recall that the overview of tricky paradigms at the outset 
included several phenomena that run opposite to the PC effect, reflecting failures to consider 
aggregate information. For instance, suboptimal choices in dilemma games originate in the 
failure to understand that cooperation is of great advantage across many trials, although 
defection is clearly the optimal strategy at the level of individual trials. A similar failure to 
aggregate over longer time frames is apparent in various delay-of-gratification problems 
(Metcalf & Mischel, 1999). In group decision making, too, performance suffers from the fact 
that the information that is distributed over group members is not combined effectively 
(Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2006). Thus, the PC bias toward higher aggregation levels is not 
universal but restricted to certain task conditions. But what are the boundary conditions that 
trigger either PC-like biases toward higher aggregation levels or reverse biases toward low-
aggregate, individuating information in different task settings?  
Encoding and reinforcement structure of the task. There is little direct empirical 
evidence at the moment to provide an informed answer, but two crucial boundary conditions 
suggest themselves, the encoding structure and the reinforcement structure of the task. For a 
general rule, PC illusions can be expected to occur under conditions that facilitate aggregate-
level encoding and aggregate-level reinforcement. In contrast, when the task environment 
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emphasizes individual events or outcomes and prevents the decision maker from aggregate-
level encoding and reinforcement, then an opposite bias can be expected to occur.  
To illustrate this crucial point, consider the hypothetical dilemma game depicted in 
Figure 4. Given nature plays cooperatively, the participant wins 10 from cooperation but 20 
from defecting on every trial. Given nature defects, the participant wins nothing (0) from 
cooperation but 2 from defecting. Thus, at trial level, one ought to defect. However, it is well 
known that multi-trial dilemmas create reciprocal behavior, that is, on aggregate, across trials, 
nature tends to match one’s own strategy, playing tit for tat. Let us assume nature cooperates 
75% of the time when participant also cooperates on 75% of the trials, and that nature’s 
cooperation rate is 25% when the participant’s cooperation rate is 25%. As Figure 4 shows, 
when aggregating over many trials, the expected payoff is clearly higher (i.e., 5.625 vs. 1.874) 
when the cooperation baserate is high (75%) rather than low (25%). The question then is 
whether participants have a real chance to encode this aggregate-level contingency and to 
vividly experience the reinforcement associated with aggregate-level strategies.  
In a typical dilemma game environment, participants have to make a decision on every 
single trial, and they are immediately reinforced with a feedback about the outcome of that 
trial. Such immediate reinforcement forces the participant not to forgo any profit at trial level 
and prevents her from costly long-term explorations at aggregate level. In order to experience 
and encode the aggregate-level contingency in favor of cooperation, it would be necessary 
that (a) the participant refrains from maximal payoffs over an extended time period; (b) that 
nature reciprocates and also converts to cooperation; (c) that the participant must somehow 
anticipate reciprocal cooperation; and (d) that learning and memory of the contingency 
between one’s own cooperation baserate and nature’s reciprocation baserate has to be 
successful. No doubt, these conditions are very unlikely to be met simultaneously.  
Conversely, a slightly modified version of the very same dilemma task may indeed 
produce a PC-effect, facilitating the insight that cooperation is worth while. Let us assume the 
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participant is not an actor in a dilemma task who is reinforced on every trial but, rather, an 
observer who witnesses an actor’s cooperation rate and reward rate over a longer time period, 
postponing a judgment to the end of the entire sequence. From such a remote perspective, the 
participant should easily recognize that a high baserate of cooperation comes along with a 
high payoff rate, especially when other strategies (e.g., high defection baserates observed in 
other players or in different time periods) are met with low payoffs or losses.  
To continue this thought experiment, moreover, closer analyses may reveal that the wise 
observer uses the PC algorithm rather than a contingency algorithm proper. That is, it may be 
sufficient to recognize that both cooperation baserates, for the player and for nature, are 
skewed in the same direction, regardless of whether the player’s and nature’s cooperation 
actually correlate over trials. To test this assumption one might let observers witness a 
sequential dilemma game in which both the player and nature cooperate at a high (75%) or 
both at a low (25%) baserate. However, in one experimental condition, nature cooperates 
clearly more when the player cooperates. In another condition, nature cooperates at the same 
(constantly high or low) rate regardless of whether the player cooperates or not. If the 
observer’s belief that payoff increases with cooperation is the same in both conditions, this 
would be cogent evidence for PC inferences rather than contingencies proper.  
Further analyses of other multi-level problems corroborate the assumption that the 
spontaneously chosen aggregation level reflects the encoding and reinforcement structure of 
the task. In group decision making, what is most likely to be encoded and communicated in 
group discussion is the individual decision maker’s personal preferences. In contrast, the 
group-level information and the group-level preference is unlikely to be encoded, discussed 
and assessed effectively (Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2006). With respect to reinforcement, or 
payoffs, although the modal individual preferences may diverge from the aggregate group 
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preferences, decisions based on simple majority rules, such as the Condorcet principle5, have 
been shown to provide close to optimal solutions most of the time (Hastie & Kameda, 2005). 
Moreover, the unreflected premise in group-decision making research that group-level 
information is more valid than a majority rule applied to individual-level information is an 
open empirical question, rather than an a-priori truth. In any case, it is no surprise that group 
decisions do not exhibit PC illusions (i.e., no bias toward aggregate-level information), simply 
because the encoding structure of the task setting does not support aggregate-level encoding. 
The crucial point to be conveyed here – that the encoding and payoff structure of the 
task determines the aggregation level of the decision process – is nicely illustrated in recent 
research on Simpson’s paradox. In a typical experiment (Fiedler, Walther, Freytag & Nickel, 
2003; Schaller, 1992; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 1995), participants observe, as already 
depicted above, that more female applicants for graduate programs than male applicants are 
rejected. However, the seeming disadvantage of females turns out to reflect an ecological 
correlation; that is, what renders females less successful is the higher rejection rate of those 
universities to which females apply predominantly. When the unequal rejection rate of 
different universities (ecologies) is partialled out, the rejection rate of female individuals 
within universities actually turns out to be lower than the male rejection rate. Thus, Simpson’s 
paradox is a special case of a multi-level problem that entails a spurious correlation.  
Thus, participants who have to judge and compare males and females on such complex 
tasks have to make a choice between two representations: (a) they can either encode the 
female disadvantage across universities (noting that rejection rate in some universities are 
high because there are to many female applicants), or (b) encode the female advantage within 
universities (noting that the apparent male superiority merely reflects the unequal rejection 
rates of different universities). What level is rational, or normatively correct, depends on 
one’s causal model. If the cause lies in the universities’ unequal difficulty level, it is rational 
                                                 
5
 According to the Condorcet rule, a choice option or candidate is chosen if it receives more than half of the 
individual votes in group decision making. 
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to compare individual males and females within universities. If the cause lies in the 
universities’ unequal gender composition, it is rational to focus on the ecological correlation 
between gender rates and rejection rates across universities.  
What cognitive representation is chosen in judgment experiments using Simpson’s 
paradox depends on the encoding and reinforcement structure. On one hand, with regard to 
encoding, when the temporal order in which the stimulus observations are provided supports 
interpretation (a), presenting applicant’s gender before the university name to highlight the 
primacy of applicant gender as an antecedent of university rejection rates, then they tend to 
see a female disadvantage. If, however, the presentation order facilitates interpretation (b), 
indicating the university prior to the applicant’s gender to highlight the antecedent role of 
university standards, they tend to recognize the female superiority (Fiedler et al., 2003; 
Fiedler, Walther, Freytag & Stryczek, 2002).  
On the other hand, with regard to reinforcement, when feminist motives are solicited or 
when participants hold feminist attitudes, they tend to prefer interpretation (b) over (a) 
because the former interpretation is more reinforcing from a feminist perspective (Schaller, 
1992). – Needless to repeat that the “true” solution to the problem is unknown, or at least it 
cannot be determined on the basis of statistical contingencies alone.  
Higher-order memory codes. PC-like biases toward higher aggregation levels are most 
pronounced when complex information calls for higher-order categorical encoding. 
Participants in a study by Fiedler and Graf (1990) first learned whether a virus was observed 
or not in 24 different countries. Then, in a second run, they were informed about the 
occurrence of a disease in the same countries. To be sure, memorizing the precise distribution 
of virus and disease across as many as 24 countries is hardly possible. However, given that all 
countries could be categorized into six geographical clusters (Scandinavian; Mediterranean; 
South American etc.), the memory load reduced to learning the relative occurrence rate of 
virus and disease in only six geographical clusters. These were spontaneously used as highly 
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effective and economical encoding units, as often demonstrated in memory experiments with 
categorized lists (Cohen, 1969; Shuell, 1969). Thus, holding the contingency between virus 
and disease constant (i.e., the number of matching pairs, or countries in which virus and 
disease were jointly present or absent), participants came up with pronounced contingency 
estimates only when matching pairs consistently came from the same clusters (i.e., virus and 
disease jointly present in all countries of some clusters and jointly absent in others), but not 
when the same number of matches was evenly distributed across all clusters. In the former 
case, a marked ecological correlation helped participants to encode the coincidence of virus 
and disease at the level of higher-order memory units.  
Summary and Conclusions 
The present chapter started with the contention that the complex and difficult problems 
of the environment that the probabilistic mind has to deal with do not primarily reflect the 
probabilistic nature of the empirical reality. That the world is not strictly deterministic not 
only creates uncertainty and sometimes stress but also entails optimism and the potential for 
progress and control. Rather, what renders the world difficult and conflict-prone is that it 
looks different from different perspectives. This important insight is at the heart of several 
research paradigms that have enhanced our understanding of the probabilistic mind. The 
conditional reasoning paradigm highlights the fact that inferences from X to Y may diverge 
drastically from reverse inferences from Y to X (Fiedler, 2000b; Koriat, Fiedler & Bjork, 
2006). Construal-level theory is concerned with the changing appearance of the world as a 
function of temporal, spatial and social distance (Trope & Liberman, 2003). The 
pseudocontingency (PC) illusion that was the focus of the present chapter adds another way in 
which the world is subject to perspectival changes and relativity (see also Stewart, Chater, 
Stott & Reimers, 2003). As a matter of principle, environmental correlations vary in size and 
even in sign when considered at different aggregation levels. The PC illusion reflects a 
cognitive bias toward assessing contingencies at high rather than low levels of aggregation. 
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The contingencies that hold between group or category baserates are (mis)taken as a proxy for 
the contingency that holds between individuating people or events within categories.  
The PC illusion was only recently discovered, but it was then found to generalize across 
many task conditions, content areas, and decision problems. Like all illusions, the impact of 
PC biases can be quite massive and hard to believe. However, just like other perceptual and 
cognitive illusions, PCs can be understood as plausible and functional when their learning 
environment is taken into account. Like any illusion, PCs can be characterized as 
overgeneralizations of heuristics that function well in many task contexts while producing 
errors and distortions when carried over to other contexts.  
In any case, PCs constitute a fascinating topic in the study of the probabilistic mind, the 
topic of higher-order contingency problems. A closer examination of other examples of such 
higher-order contingencies – such as Simpson’s paradox, dilemma games, or group decision 
making – suggests that PC biases to attend to high aggregation levels may be reduced, 
eliminated or even reversed when the encoding and reinforcement structure of the task 
facilitates an attention shift from high levels to low levels of aggregation.  
Research on higher-order contingency problems is only beginning to grow (Fiedler & 
Plessner, in press; Spellman, 1996). However, in spite of the paucity of systematic research 
conducted so far, there can be no doubt that such problems provide a major challenge for the 
probabilistic mind as it has to cope with the pitfalls of utility assessment, risky choice, causal 
inference and prediction and – last but not least – with the pitfalls of scientific inference.  
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Figure 1 
Illustration of divergent contingencies between student gender (m = male, f = female) 
and achievement (+ = high, – = low). At the level of classes, average performance is perfectly 
correlated with male proportion. However, within all classes, females outperform males.  
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Figure 2 
Setting pseudocontingencies apart from genuine contingencies. All three distributions 
imply positive pseudocontingencies, because the marginal distributions for rows and columns 
are skewed in the same direction, the contingency varies from negative (a) to zero (b) to 
positive (c). 
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Figure 3 
Variety of factors bearing contingencies with student performance 
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Figure 4 
Dilemma game as a multi-level problem. Although payoffs at the level of individual 
trials are higher when the player defects (upper panel), the aggregate value of cooperation is 
higher over many trials. 
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